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Abstract: We investigate whether the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of 
Chinese companies has a certain impact on firm value, and further, depending 
on the level of corporate governance, how the impact of CSR on firm value 
changes. First, CSR activities generate a positive effect on firm value suggesting 
that companies may have an incentive to be willing and to continue to perform 
their CSR activities. Second, if the ratio of the largest shareholder’s stake is low 
(high) or the gap between the largest and the second-largest shareholder’s stakes 
is small (large), CSR activities lead to a significant positive (negative) impact on 
firm value. Third, we find a positive impact for firms with high management or 
auditor ownership and for firms whose CEO and chairman of the board are not 
the same person. Interestingly, due to the fact that significant numbers of outside 
directors of Chinese companies are appointed by the largest shareholders in 
China, CSR activity may be used to better align the company with the private 
interests of the largest shareholders than with the interests of other shareholders, 
thus lowering firm value. Lastly, if the company’s largest shareholder is the 
country government, CSR has a positive impact on firm value. In this case, the 
largest shareholder—the country government—carries out CSR activities for 
social benefit because such a benefit is naturally aligned with the country’s inter-
ests in the company. This paper also sheds light on Chinese companies’ corpo-
rate governance structure that enhances socially responsible activities and firm 
value. Our results suggest that good governance provides incentives to volun-
tarily and continuously perform socially responsible activities.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past decades, corporate social responsibility (hereinafter referred to as 
CSR) activities have emerged as an integral part of businesses, investors, govern-
ments, and other areas of society. Companies become major players in an economy, 
but also cause many business-related and social problems. Moreover, given the global-
ization of the world economy, CSR activities in foreign countries have become 
important.1 In fact, many companies dedicate a section of their annual reports and cor-
porate websites to CSR activities, emphasizing the importance they attach to such 
activities. Chinese companies are no exception.2
However, in China, different from other developed or developing countries, the 
pace of the development of laws, regulations, and institutional systems has failed to 
keep up with the speed of economic growth. The credibility and image of the corpo-
rate sector have declined sharply because of the illegal and unfair practices of some 
companies. Recently, situations such as food made from waste materials, the illegal 
disposal of toxic substances, a harsh labor environment, and a heavy burden on 
employees have created a social sentiment that requires Chinese companies to dedi-
cate more resources to CSR activities.
Since first introduced in the 1930s, CSR has been a main research topic in busi-
ness practice and corporate governance. Friedman (1970) defines CSR as managing a 
company to enable it to create as much wealth as possible while obeying laws and 
ethical practices, which is a very narrow definition of CSR. In response, McWilliams 
and Siegel (2000) propose a more comprehensive definition of CSR activities as the 
act of creating a social good that goes beyond corporate interests and the requirements 
of the law. According to CSR theory, companies not only pay for benefits to share-
holders but also must bear a certain amount of social responsibility by considering the 
interests of other stakeholders in society.
Despite significant research on CSR, previous studies provide mixed results on the 
effect of such activities on firm value (see Griffin and Mahon (1997), Orlitzky (2001), 
Orlitzky et al. (2003), Margolis and Walsh (2003), and Margolis et al. (2007) for 
reviews of the literature). Although there appears to be more support for the view that 
  1. For example, in 2012, Foxconn—known for assembling most of Apple’s products—was 
linked to multiple employee suicides and poor working conditions, which in turn damaged 
Apple’s company image.
  2. For example, an article in World Economic Forum(2015) notes the  importance of CSR for 
Chinese companies through change in strategic thinking by mentioning “…Today, leading 
Chinese companies seek to become some of the world’s most reputable and pre-eminent 
brands and view CSR as a critical part of their transformation….”
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CSR activities are positively related to profitability and firm value, a large number of 
studies find the opposite relation. As a result, the normative implications of the 
research on CSR remain uncertain.
In this paper, we propose an indirect relation between CSR and firm value by con-
sidering the corporate governance structure. Similar to Servaes and Tamayo (2014), 
we also emphasize the channels through which CSR affects firm value. However, 
unlike them, we use the insight that the impact of CSR on firm value depends on the 
ability of CSR to influence shareholders and not stakeholders of the firm. We first 
focus on the effect of CSR activities on firm values using an empirical analysis of Chi-
nese listed companies. We then determine whether these activities additionally incur 
costs to companies or are a good business practice that enhances firm value. 
Although most previous studies focus only on the relation between CSR activities 
and firm value, we further analyze whether this relationship depends on the corporate 
governance structure, which is a key contribution of the paper. Corporate governance 
is a mechanism for protecting external investors, improving the value of the company, 
and maximizing shareholder value (Beltratti 2005). The consensus is that corporate 
governance is positively related to firm value (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Allen et al. 
2005). If CSR activities increase a company’s value, companies with good corporate 
governance are more likely to be more actively engaged in CSR activities.3 Kook and 
Kang (2011) analyze the relationship between corporate governance and CSR using 
Korean company data and show that companies with better corporate governance 
more actively engage in CSR activities. 
In our analysis, we employ data on Chinese publicly listed companies from 2008–
2010, which cover the CSR activities of a large subset of Chinese companies, and 
combine them with their financial statement data. Our main performance metric is 
Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of the firm divided by the replacement value of 
its assets. We start by assessing whether firms with high corporate governance mea-
sures can enhance firm value by increasing CSR activities, and find this to be the case 
in models that employ firm fixed effects. CSR activities have a negligible or negative 
impact on firm value for firms with low corporate governance measures, suggesting 
that the costs of CSR activities may outweigh the benefits for these firms. However, 
  3. Due to the weak corporate governance structure, if managers can enjoy private benefits, 
they can pursue CSR activities for the purpose of promoting their own private benefits in 
contrast to corporate value. At this time, those CSR activities carried out to pursue the 
private interests of managers can be profitable for managers only. For shareholders, it will 
be the cost of the amount spent for CSR activities, so firm value will be undermined by it. 
The better the corporate governance structure, the more likely the CSR activities are to be 
effectively controlled.
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we find a positive impact for firms with high management or auditor ownership and 
for firms whose CEO and chairman of the board are not the same person. Moreover, 
because significant numbers of outside directors of Chinese companies are appointed 
by the largest shareholders in China, CSR activities may be used to better align the 
company with the private interests of the largest shareholders than with the interests of 
other shareholders, thus lowering firm value. Lastly, if the company’s largest share-
holder is the country, CSR has a positive impact on firm value. In this case, the largest 
shareholder—the country—carries out CSR activities for social benefit because such a 
benefit is naturally aligned with the country’s interests in the company.
This article contributes to the debate on the role of CSR in corporate strategy. This 
research is important because it presents the first empirical evidence from an examina-
tion of whether corporate governance measures are associated with improved financial 
value through CSR activities for Chinese companies. This study can potentially alert 
policymakers in developing countries to the increasing overlap between corporate 
governance and CSR agendas, the need to reform the regulatory and judicial systems 
from the context of corporate governance structure, and to increase institutional pres-
sure to enhance CSR adoption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the back-
ground, related studies, and research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selec-
tion, the variables, and the regression model. Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and provides implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
CSR and Firm Value
Previous empirical research on the relationship between CSR and corporate value 
shows mixed results. Many empirical studies find that companies’ CSR activities have 
positive effects on their financial performance. Prior studies such as Bowman and 
Haire (1975), Heinze (1976), and Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) present the results of 
increased financial performance from a company’s CSR activities. Cochran and Wood 
(1984) investigate the financial performance of 36 companies from 1979 to 1975 and 
of 39 companies from 1970 to 1974. They find a positive correlation between CSR 
activities and financial performance, proxied by financial variables such as return on 
assets (ROA), return on sales, and market valuations. Preston and O’Bannon (1997) 
analyze data on 67 large companies in the United States from 1982 to 1992 and find a 
strong positive relation between CSR activities and financial performance, including 
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ROA and return on equity (ROE). In the 1990s, Waddock and Graves (1997) investi-
gate data on S&P 500 companies and find that both a company’s prior and future 
financial performance, as indicated by debt-to-equity ratio, ROA, and equity returns, 
are positively associated with corporate social performance activities as measured 
using the KLD index. Using Korean company data, Kim (2009) demonstrates that the 
value of companies performing CSR activities is higher. He argues that, although CSR 
activities generate costs in the short term, they enhance the reputation of the company, 
increase sales, and lower costs in the long term.
In contrast, claims have been made that CSR activities negatively influence a com-
pany’s financial performance. Bragdon and Marlin (1972) argue that companies’ CSR 
activities have an adverse impact on competition because of the increase in compa-
nies’ costs compared with that of competitors. Vance (1975) measures the financial 
performance of a company using the percentage change in its stock price and mea-
sures CSR using Milton Moskowitz’s social responsibility rating. He finds that the 
stock prices of corporates with a higher CSR grade are actually lower. The additional 
costs incurred to fulfill social responsibilities lowers companies’ profits. 
Some studies take a neutral stance. Unlike the aforementioned studies, Ullmann 
(1985) argues that finding reasons regarding the relationship a company’s social 
responsibility and financial performance is difficult. Zheng Li (2006) studies the rela-
tionship between CSR and corporate value by analyzing 521 Chinese companies listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2003. Using stakeholder theory and social capital 
theory, he concludes that, although the value of firms engaging in more social respon-
sibility activities are lower in the short run, CSR activities do not reduce firm value in 
the long run.
In all, claims of a negative relationship between CSR and corporate value empha-
size the additional costs incurred to perform CSR activities, which can be a competi-
tive disadvantage. In contrast, claims of a positive relationship argue that the costs of 
CSR activities are relatively small compared with their benefits. More CSR activities 
enhance a company’s image and improve relationships between employees and other 
stakeholders—ultimately resulting in higher firm value.
We expect that investments in CSR activities in areas such as labor relations, envi-
ronmental issues, and community development will assist in improving the corporate 
image, maintaining a smooth relationship between the community and employees, and 
attracting better workers in the long run. In contrast, if a company avoids engaging in 
CSR activities to reduce its short-term costs, it may fail to meet stakeholder expecta-
tions. Such a company may face more problems and lawsuits in the long run.
For example, the fine for excessive pollution or the cost to recall products with 
defects can be larger without CSR activities. The damage to a company’s image and 
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reputation is also more significant (Tsoutsoura 2004). Most of all, companies volun-
tarily continue to perform CSR activities only if they have a positive impact on long-
term firm values (Guk and Gang 2011). In this paper, we develop the following 
hypothesis regarding the impact of a company’s social responsibility activities on firm 
value.
H1: Corporate social responsibility activities increase the value of the firm.
 Effects of corporate governance on the impact of CSR activities on firm values
If a company’s CSR activities can increase its firm value, CSR activities can be 
regarded as a business strategy and managers may select the level and extent of these 
activities. In this case, agency costs associated with CSR activities may occur. Execu-
tives may abuse their rights by selecting a CSR policy that does not correspond to 
shareholder interests but, instead, enhances private interests. In other words, if manag-
ers can enjoy private benefits, such as enhancing their own reputations by performing 
CSR activities, they have an incentive to engage in such activities regardless of the 
effect on firm value (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Therefore, we expect that the impact 
of corporate CSR activities varies depending on corporate governance, including own-
ership and board structures.
H2: The effects of corporate social responsibility activities on firm values differ 
depending on the degree of corporate governance.
Studies on the ownership structure of Chinese companies focus on the concentra-
tion of corporate ownership, the characteristics of the ownership, and insider share-
holdings. Two arguments are related to concentration of ownership. One argument 
states that companies with more concentrated ownership are better at executive moni-
toring through the majority shareholder. In contrast, the other argument states that 
majority shareholders may expropriate the interests of the minor shareholders for their 
own interests.
Monitoring theory argues that majority shareholders who expect high returns have 
a strong incentive to monitor managers and prevent behavior that may harm share-
holder interests. The empirical result of Morck et al. (1988) shows that, as the largest 
shareholder holdings ratio increases, agency costs are likely to decrease because the 
majority shareholder reduces the conflicts of interest between managers and share-
holders by overseeing managers’ opportunistic behavior.
In contrast, other empirical research provides different results and finds negative 
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effects of ownership concentration on firm value. Leech and Leahy (1991) obtain the 
result that ownership concentration has a significant negative effect on firm value. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that, in some countries, the agency problem occurs 
more in the conflict between the majority shareholder and minority shareholders than 
between managers and shareholders. In this circumstance, the interests of the majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders are not aligned. In this case, major sharehold-
ers can abuse their rights and ineffectively allocate company resources, and the cost of 
owning shares can be very large to minority shareholders. Therefore, if the ratio of the 
largest shareholder’s holdings is high, or if the difference between the ratio of the larg-
est shareholder’s holdings and that of the second largest shareholder’s holdings is suf-
ficiently large, the largest shareholder may be able to proceed with CSR activities for 
private benefit, which may have a negative effect on firm value.
H2-1: A lower ratio of the largest shareholder’s holdings results in a higher firm 
value.
H2-2: Corporate social responsibility activities lead to higher firm values if the dif-
ference in the holdings ratio between the largest and the second largest share-
holders is small, and leads to lower firm values if this difference is large.
Shareholdings by management can provide an incentive for executives to maxi-
mize the value of the shares and increase corporate control by shareholders by aligning 
executives’ and shareholders’ interests. Many previous studies claim a positive rela-
tionship between management ownership and corporate value, and describe this rela-
tionship as a mechanism to align the interests of executives and shareholders (Demsetz 
1983; Hill and Snell 1989; Morck et al. 1988; Cho 1998).
Shares owned by executives can cause managers’ and shareholders’ interests to 
converge. Berle and Gardiner (1932) state that a potential conflict of interest arises 
from the separation of ownership and corporate control. Later, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) propose the incentive alignment hypothesis: as managers’ shares increase, the 
interests of managers and shareholders converge and, therefore, agency costs decrease. 
Sometimes, managers allocate company resources for their private interest, which cre-
ates conflicts with external shareholders. However, the manager-owner of a company 
has incentives to fulfill these shareholders’ needs because both parties’ incentives are 
more aligned. A recent empirical study of U.K. companies by Florackis (2008) con-
cludes that a high management shareholding ratio reduces agency costs.
However, the management entrenchment hypothesis (Stulz, 1990) states that, as 
managers’ shares increase, outside threats from the market decrease and the utility 
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from seeking private benefit exceeds the utility from an increase in firm value. These 
effects lead to managerial entrenchment.
In this study, we choose the incentive alignment hypothesis and expect that a high-
er ratio of executive management shareholdings indicates better alignment of their 
interests with that of external stakeholders, thus mitigating the conflict of interest 
issue. That is, a higher ratio of management shareholdings indicates that CSR activi-
ties are geared more toward the interests of shareholders than the private interests of 
executives.
H2-3: CSR activities have a positive effect on firm value if the ratio of managers’ 
shares is high, but a negative effect if the ratio is low. 
Another way to reduce agency costs is to increase directors’ or the audit commit-
tee’s shareholdings, which is the same concept as executives’ shareholdings, by align-
ing their interests with those of shareholders (Jensen 1993). If executives receive just a 
fixed salary, they may act to enhance their personal short-term interests rather than 
those of shareholders. In contrast, if directors or audit committee members own shares 
of the company, they will more actively monitor managers’ behavior and propose 
management strategies that benefit both shareholders and themselves. According to 
claims by Mace (1986), monitoring efficiency can increase when directors or audit 
committee members possess adequate shares of stock. Kren and Kerr (1997) demon-
strate that the ratio of director shareholdings has a positive effect on firm value.
We expect that directors’ or audit committee members’ shareholdings result in 
stronger incentives and motivation to oversee CEO behavior. Thus, CSR strategy is 
carried out to increase firm value. We also expect that this notion is valid for shares 
held by audit committee members.
H2-4: If the ratio of directors’ shares is high (low), CSR has a positive (negative) 
effect on firm value.
H2-5: If the ratio of the audit committee’s share is high (low), CSR has a positive 
(negative) effect on firm value.
The claims as to whether the CEO and chairman of the board of directors should be 
different people are conflicting—often referred to as the CEO-duality problem. Agency 
theory predicts that when corporate ownership and management rights are separated, 
agency problems occur because of (i) conflicts of interest between managers, including 
the CEO, and shareholders and (ii) incomplete information (or information asymme-
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try). Agency theory assumes that agents are selfish and monitoring is necessary to pre-
vent executives from making self-serving decisions. The board of directors needs to 
play this supervisory role. However, if the CEO and the chairman of the board are the 
same person, agency theory predicts that executive directors are highly likely to pur-
sue private benefits rather than maximize shareholders’ interests. 
In contrast, stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis 1991) assumes that individu-
als are organization oriented and pro-organizational and argues that executives rather 
choose to serve the interests of the organization and maximize shareholder value than 
pursue their private interests. Similarly, Boyd (1995) claims that executives are likely 
to seek self-satisfaction and fulfillment more than private benefits. In all, if steward-
ship theory is true, it predicts that CEO-duality provides more freedom to executives 
and leads to rapid decision making, which leads to higher firm value.
We choose the more conventional view—agency theory—that indicates that indi-
viduals are self-centered. We assume that it is possible that CEO-directors perform 
CSR activities for private benefit.
H2-6: If the CEO and chairman of the board are not the same person, CSR has a 
positive effect on firm value.
Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasize the importance of the board’s role of supervi-
sion and control over management. To reduce management’s pursuit of private bene-
fits, setting up an institution such as the board of directors and the audit committee is 
necessary to monitor executives’ behavior. The main role of the board of directors and 
the audit committee is to mitigate conflicts of interest between shareholders and man-
agement, minimize agency costs, and protect the interests of shareholders. Beasley et 
al. (2000) demonstrate that financial statement fraud is less prevalent among firms 
with a strong audit committee.
Further, according to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer amd Salancik 2003), 
organizations such as the board of directors or the audit committee can assist in 
accessing the company’s information and providing important feedback for setting the 
company’s direction. Zahra and Pearce (1989) also claim that directors or an audit 
committee can provide connections to competitors and other stakeholders and help a 
company acquire important information, skills, reputation, and other resources.
Thus, if the board of directors or audit committee is large, its supervisory role will 
be enhanced and CSR will be carried out to improve firm value rather than to benefit 
the company’s major shareholders or CEO. The opinions and views of the directors or 
audit committee members are also expected to help the effective CSR activities.
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H2-7: If the board of directors is large (small), CSR activities have positive (nega-
tive) effects on firm value.
H2-8: If the audit committee is large (small), CSR activities have positive (nega-
tive) effects on firm value.
Independence of outside directors is indispensable for effective governance and 
discipline. We can easily find evidence to support the following relationship: a higher 
proportion of outside directors at a firm results in discipline being exerted more effec-
tively over management and, thereby, in better firm performance. A review article by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also supports the causality previously mentioned. 
Their main conclusions are that a higher proportion of outside directors leads to a 
higher probability that the CEO will be replaced when corporate performance declines 
and lower CEO compensation, which are consistent with the hypotheses considered in 
this paper.4 However, for Chinese companies, the largest shareholders or chief execu-
tive officers often appoint directors of other large companies as outside directors of 
their own companies. Such an appointment process might be one reason for the dam-
age to the independency of outside directors in China. Because major shareholders or 
managers can nominate outside directors, their relationship is not for supervision and 
monitoring but for cooperation and accordance (Ma Qingyun, 2013).
Westphal (1998) also show that executives use their power to influence the process 
of selecting directors and their decision making. They are involved in appointing 
directors who primarily support their managerial decisions.
We expect that the largest shareholder and the executives are more willing to per-
form CSR activities for their own benefit. In this case, a company with a higher pro-
portion of outside directors who primarily support the executives (the so-called gray 
directors) is expected to have a lower firm value from CSR activities.
H2-9: CSR has a positive (negative) effect on firm value if the proportion of out-
side directors at a firm is low (high).
A significant number of Chinese companies are state owned. There are conflicting 
claims about the effects on firm value when the largest shareholder is the government 
in China. Tian (2005) demonstrates that the financial performance of state-owned 
  4. For details, refer to their paper. However, note that no significant relationship exists 
between the proportion of outside directors and the corporate performance measured using 
accounting income or stock returns. 
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companies is generally lower than that of private companies. The explanation is that, 
although governments provide a variety of preferential treatment for state-owned com-
panies, they also take significant profits from these companies. Chen Xinyuan and 
Huang Jun (2007) argue that the government puts more emphasis on the realization of 
political objectives and social functions than on the company’s interests and, thus, 
greater interference is observed in the management of state-owned companies. Xu 
Xiaodong and Chen Xiaoyue (2003) claim that private companies have higher firm 
values because they receive more external oversight and make more aggressive deci-
sions than state-owned companies to survive market competition. 
In contrast, some scholars argue that state ownership can increase firm value. Liu 
Yuanyuan et al. (2011) demonstrate that the ratio of a company’s state ownership 
shows a significantly positive correlation with financial performance. Liao Guan Min 
and Chen Yan (2007) argue that when state-owned companies face financial distress, 
the government reduces the capital costs of these companies through support from the 
government’s budget, which positively affects the company’s financial performance. 
Sun et al. (2002) use Chinese company data from 1994 to 1997 and find that the ratio 
of state-owned shareholdings has a positive effect on firm value.
Because the ultimate purpose of the government is to maximize social welfare rath-
er than company profits, CSR activities may be regarded as the realization of a national 
policy if the company’s controlling shareholder is the government. We expect that if 
the company’s largest shareholder is the government, CSR activities positively affect 
firm value because agency costs are not incurred as a result of their implementation.
H2-10: CSR activities show positive (negative) effects on firm values if the largest 
shareholder is (not) the government.
Relationship between corporate governance and CSR activities
Corporate governance is a mechanism for protecting external investors, improving 
the value of a company, and maximizing shareholder value (Beltratti, 2005). If CSR 
activities increase a company’s value, companies with good corporate governance are 
more likely to be more engaged in CSR activities. Guk and Gang (2011) analyze the 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR with Korean company data and 
show that companies with better corporate governance are more active with CSR 
activities. Choi (2013) studies the correlation between corporate governance variables 
and capital costs and concludes that a higher ratio of the largest shareholdings results 
in lower CSR activities.
Wang and Bu (2012) study Chinese food manufacturers and find that the ratio of 
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the largest shareholder of a company has a negative impact on CSR activities. They 
also found that the size of the board is positively correlated with CSR activities. Xie 
(2011) also finds a strong relationship between corporate governance structure and 
CSR activities, indicating that the ratio of the largest shareholder’s holdings has a neg-
ative effect on CSR activities and state ownership has a positive effect.
Therefore, companies with better corporate governance, that is, companies with 
lower agency costs, are expected to engage in more CSR activities.
H3: Good governance structure and practices are positively associated with CSR 
activities.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data
This study uses data from 2008–2010. Data were collected on 277 Chinese compa-
nies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 90, Shenzhen Stock Exchange 63), and that met the following condi-
tions:
(1) does not belong to the financial sector;
(2) has a fiscal year end of December 31; and, 
(3) has CSR score data for three consecutive years, from 2008 to 2010.
The financial sector is excluded because it is regarded as highly regulated, indicat-
ing that heterogeneity exists when comparing its financial characteristics with those of 
the nonfinancial sector. The industry classification for the sample companies is repre-
sented in <Table 1>.
Table 1. Industry Classification of the Sample Companie
Exchange
Industry classification Shanghai Shenzhen Total
Manufacturing 90 63 153
Transportation 21 2 23
Electricity, gas, utilities 16 4 20
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Telecommunication 14 6 20
Mining 9 3 12
Construction 6 2 8
Wholesale, retail 6 3 9
Real estate, rent 4 9 13
Service 4 2 6
General 4 5 9
Agriculture, Forest, Fishery 1 1 2
Entertainment, Culture 1 1 2
Total 176 101 277
Empirical Analysis
Variables
The definition of the key variables for the empirical analysis and their measure-
ment method are summarized in <Table 2>.
Table 2. Definition of the Key Variables
Variables Definition Measurement
Dependent variable
Value Firm value Tobin’s Q
Explanatory variables





The largest shareholder’s holdings/total 
outstanding shares
Z Z index The largest shareholder’s holdings/second largest shareholder’s holding
manageshr Managers’ share ratio Mangers’ shareholdings/total outstanding shares
directshr Directors’ share ratio Directors’ shareholdings/total outstanding shares
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supervisorshr Auditors’ share ratio Auditors’ shareholdings/total outstanding shares
P
CEO and chairperson 
are or are not the same 
individual
If CEO and chairperson are the same, then 1; 
otherwise 0
dsize Size of board Number of directors on the board
ssize Size of supervisory committee
Number of auditors
Indep_ratio Ratio of independent directors
Independent directors/total directors
stateowner State-owned If state-owned then 1; otherwise 0
Control variables
SIZE Size of a firm Natural logarithm of total assets
EPS Earnings per share Net income/total shares outstanding
LEV Debt to equity Debt/total equity
GRW Growth rate of assets Growth rate of assets
Corporate governance structure and financial statement data for the sample were 
collected through the CSMAR database and from CCER data. Data related to CSR 
activities were used, and the CSR scores were published by the Rankins CSR Ratings 
(RKS) 2008–2010. Founded in 2007, RKS is known as a prestigious rating agency 
that assesses the social responsibility of enterprises in China and provides objective 
and scientific assessments of CSR information.
The RKS rating system used in this study is as follows. A score is composed of 
four columns, including Macrocosm (full configuration), Content (information), Tech-
nique (technology), and Industry (industry). Under the four columns are 15 sub-items. 
The company’s experts evaluate the social responsibility report submitted by the com-
panies on a scale of 100 points. The ratios of the four columns—Macrocosm, Content, 
Technique, and Industry—are 30%, 45%, 15%, and 10%, respectively. The evaluation 
system is shown in detail in <Table 3>. Industry trends of CSR scores and yearly CSR 
scores in the sample are summarized in <Table 4>.
Tobin’s Q ratio is used as a proxy variable of firm value and is obtained by divid-
ing the sum of the market capitalization and the book value of total debt by the book 
value of total assets. Other variables that affect firm value are presented, as well as the 
corporate governance variables already included in the study. As control variables in 
this study, the natural logarithm of market capitalization as a proxy for firm size, earn-
ings per share, debt to equity ratios, and growth in total assets are adopted.
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M1 Strategic CSR goals
M2
Sustainable development: the effects of climate change, 
social problems, and the macro environment on the 
sustainable development of companies
M3
Socially responsible strategies and corporations: the effects 
of a company’s provision of products and services on 
society and the environment
M4 Announcement of sustainable development by the management of companies
M5 Planning corporate social responsibility goal
Management
M6 Basic company information
M7 A company’s social responsibility values
M8 Existence of professional labor to monitor and supervise CSR activities
M9 Methods and processes to manage environmental, societal, and economic businesses
M10 Disclosure system for company information
M11 CSR-related risk assessment and management
M12 Institutional norms for compliance of commercial morality 
M13 Joint participation in CSR activities by related sub-divisions and their subsidiaries
Stakeholders
M14 Awareness about stakeholders and their importance
M15 Long-term communication with stakeholders and improvement after receiving feedback





C1 Financial information, such as annual sales, profits, and dividends
C2 Growth rates of sales, profits, and dividends
C3 Sales of products and services, market share, innovativeness
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Employee rights/
Human rights
C4 Employees’ composition: gender, age, total number
C5 Employees’ education: total hours of education, number of employees participating in education, number of lectures
C6 Safety production: healthcare program for employees, safe working environment
C7 Human rights: same occupation–same pay, prohibition of child labor, treatment for employee reporting
C8 Working environment: employee vacation, welfare and other benefits, caring for employees 
C9
Union-related information, employee leisure activities, caring 
for family members of employees, employee satisfaction 
surveys
C10 Company training and promotion of CSR knowledge
Environment
C11
Annual test results and certification of environmental 
management systems, environmental protection investments 
by year
C12 Awareness and prevention measures against environmental pollution
C13
Identification of sources of energy and water, measurement 
and recording of energy consumption, energy-saving 
measures, and use of renewable energy
C14 Measurement and recording of carbon dioxide emissions, preventive measures (for example, boiled drinking water)
Fair operation
C15 Preventive measures related to embezzlement
C16
Active promotion of CSR-related information to society as a 
whole, overseeing the social responsibility of other social 
groups 
Consumers
C17 Quality assurance system for products and services of the business, technical innovations
C18 Consumer (customer) relationship management system, customer satisfaction surveys
C19 Protection for the safety and health of the consumer
C20 Customer service convenience, customer reporting rates, dispute settlement-related information
C21 Protection of consumer privacy information
C22 Consumer education: the practice of educating consumers about the dangers of the product
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C23 Amount of social donations
C24 Employee volunteer activities
C25 Participation in the establishment of the regional policy and industry standards
C26 Job creation: annual employee recruitment
C27
Participation in science and technology projects in the region 
and the country, contribution to the development of science 
and technology
C28 Use of natural resources after receiving permission from the local community, gathering opinions of local communities
C29 Promotion of health knowledge and improvement in disease prevention awareness in the local community
C30 Consideration of the impact on the environment and local communities when investment decisions are made 
Technique
Equity of contents
T1 Degree stated on all stakeholders related to CSR
T2 Disclosure of the extent of negative information about CSR
Consistency of 
information
T3 Consistency: consistency with previous reports
T4 Degree of the description related to the achievement of CSR activities using data or ratio information
Creativity of 
reporting
T5 Creativity of the structure and format for reporting
T6 Impact of creativity on business efficiency
Reliability/ 
transparency
T7 Degree of disclosure of stakeholders’ opinions
T8 Third party inspection
T9 Authority of third party inspection agency
T10 Efficiency in resolution of readers’ opinion of the report
Norms
T11 Policy norms of the report
T12 Degree that the report criteria are met
T13 Typographical errors made during preparation of the report
Effectiveness of 
information
T14 Satisfaction of language version of the report
T15 Accessible path of the report
T16 Improvement in disclosure effects given the design and editing of the report
T17 Table of related information, illustrated figures in the report
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mean 25.00 25.26 30.07 26.77 
max 30.80 34.74 38.60 38.60 
min 19.93 17.92 17.23 17.23 
Shenzhen
mean 22.79 28.99 29.53 27.10 
max 23.35 29.35 32.41 32.41 
min 22.22 28.62 26.65 22.22 
Mining
Shanghai
mean 45.30 52.46 57.08 51.61 
max 68.76 78.49 80.29 80.29 
min 24.66 28.64 28.05 24.66 
Shenzhen
mean 29.17 27.46 30.26 28.96 
max 34.12 31.64 35.43 35.43 





mean 20.85 23.71 20.06 21.54 
max 20.85 23.71 20.06 23.71 
min 20.85 23.71 20.06 20.06 
Shenzhen
mean 25.87 21.40 18.07 21.78 
max 25.87 21.40 18.07 25.87 
min 25.87 21.40 18.07 18.07 
Wholesale, Retail
Shanghai
mean 25.65 30.75 31.87 29.42 
max 35.86 45.77 43.97 45.77 
min 19.13 21.58 21.08 19.13 
Shenzhen
mean 27.13 29.13 33.09 29.78 
max 28.72 31.20 43.18 43.18 
min 26.12 26.48 25.14 25.14 
Real estate, lease
Shanghai
mean 24.10 27.94 28.20 26.74 
max 31.23 31.24 34.58 34.58 
min 15.56 21.77 23.49 15.56 
Shenzhen
mean 28.37 35.56 38.07 34.00 
max 36.30 71.06 71.87 71.87 
min 17.60 22.66 23.09 17.60 
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Service
Shanghai
mean 28.38 30.62 31.06 30.02 
max 34.58 31.92 40.41 40.41 
min 17.29 28.29 22.33 17.29 
Shenzhen
mean 29.19 29.38 38.01 32.19 
max 36.79 40.42 52.36 52.36 




mean 22.57 19.76 24.92 22.42 
max 22.57 19.76 24.92 24.92 
min 22.57 19.76 24.92 19.76 
Shenzhen
mean 25.97 22.43 21.93 23.44 
max 25.97 22.43 21.93 25.97 
min 25.97 22.43 21.93 21.93 
Transportation
Shanghai
mean 33.30 36.69 40.47 36.82 
max 61.73 66.91 77.59 77.59 
min 15.82 21.20 21.97 15.82 
Shenzhen
mean 28.86 37.22 38.52 34.86 
max 34.54 38.05 39.51 39.51 




mean 29.48 32.59 33.06 31.71 
max 39.64 44.84 46.66 46.66 
min 22.94 25.21 23.23 22.94 
Shenzhen
mean 36.73 35.99 39.24 37.32 
max 52.89 55.69 62.51 62.51 
min 28.70 23.68 20.96 20.96 
Manufacturing
Shanghai
mean 27.88 30.19 31.56 29.88 
max 65.12 76.14 78.44 78.44 
min 15.20 15.32 17.21 15.20 
Shenzhen
mean 28.76 32.16 34.33 31.75 
max 60.69 64.15 71.50 71.50 
min 20.42 21.75 18.77 18.77 
General
Shanghai
mean 22.92 22.53 23.00 22.82 
max 29.03 26.98 28.00 29.03 
min 18.61 17.22 16.12 16.12 
Shenzhen
mean 23.87 23.32 24.79 24.00 
max 27.97 31.21 32.33 32.33 
min 18.20 16.62 20.18 16.62 
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Telecommunication
Shanghai
mean 26.05 30.09 32.47 29.54 
max 40.85 44.33 56.15 56.15 
min 17.33 18.45 18.52 17.33 
Shenzhen
mean 26.36 31.67 39.73 32.59 
max 34.26 46.58 70.46 70.46 
min 18.86 23.00 28.23 18.86 
Total average score 28.79 31.80 33.93 31.51 
Total max score 68.76 78.49 80.29 80.29 
Total min score 15.20 15.32 16.12 15.20 
Regression analyses
Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that a two-way analysis between two variables 
is essential to understand the relevance of CSR and financial performance. Before ver-
ifying the impact of CSR activities on firm value, a causality test between CSR and 
firm value is conducted to determine whether CSR activities increase firm value (<Eq. 
1>) or whether initially high-value firms actively perform CSR activities (<Eq. 2>).
Based on the panel data analysis, we first use <Eq. 1>, <Eq. 2> to perform the cau-
sality validation
          <Eq. 1>
           <Eq. 2>
We also use panel analysis with <Eq. 3> to analyze the effects of CSR on corporate 
value.
                                     <Eq. 3> 
           
 Next, we set <Eq. 4> by adding 10 corporate governance variables in turn to evaluate 
their interaction effects with CSR.
      
                       <Eq. 4> 
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Using <Eq. 4>, we carry out panel analysis using 10 corporate governance vari-
ables, respectively. First, those governance variables are divided into two groups 
accordingly based on the level of the corporate governance variables (see <Table 10>). 
Second, regression analysis is performed for each group to determine the impact of 
CSR activities on firm value, which might appear differently depending on the value 
of the governance variables.
                                 <Eq. 5>
Finally, after analyzing the impact of CSR on firm value in accordance with the 
corporate governance variables, we perform a panel analysis using <Eq. 6> to test 
whether a company more actively engages in CSR activities under certain levels of 
corporate governance.
       
                <Eq. 6>
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics
Variables N mean max min median std. dev.
Value 831   1.8035769     15.1134    0.652    1.4785   1.1295604
CSR 831 31.507485     80.29  15.2  28.54 11.2364462
CR1 831   0.3922908      0.8641884    0.0369    0.4007   0.1626508
z 831 17.96826  274.76    1    8.0912162 26.4910084
manageshr 831   0.0254095      0.735    0    0.00003478   0.0985377
directshr 831   0.0231819      0.654    0    6.56E–06   0.0921568
supervisorshr 831   0.0014037      0.1425    0    0   0.0101306
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P 831   0.2599278      1     0    0   0.4388589
dsize 831   6.1528279    13     1    6   1.5874473
ssize 831   4.2069795    11     2    3   1.483402
Indep_ratio 831   0.3648037      0.6     0    0.3333333   0.0592038
stateowner 831   0.7256318      1     0    1   0.4464641
SIZE 831 22.670242    28.1356484   19.662737  22.5194142   1.415356
EPS 831   0.4791692      5.8932  –2.22    0.3597   0.5606302
LEV 831   1.3818031    10.8824438  –2.1862569    1.0644229   1.1045665
GRW 831   0.2410588    10.5916814  –0.722847    0.1523273   0.5755948
The basic statistics of the key variables are as follows: the average largest share-
holder stake is 39.2%, its maximum value is 86.4%, and a multiple of the Z index—
defined as the largest shareholder stake divided by the second largest shareholder 
stake—is more than a maximum of 200 times and on average 18 times, which indi-
cates a significant ownership concentration in the Chinese company companies. 
Before the regression analysis, the existence of a multicollinearity problem between 
variables should be checked to ensure that the results of the panel analysis are valid. 
The multicollinearity test result is shown in <Table 6>,5 which indicates that no strong 
correlation was found when the controlled variables were excluded. This result implies 
that this empirical study is immune to the multicollinearity problem.
Impact of corporate social responsibility activities on firm value
Before investigating the impact of CSR activities on firm value, we conduct a cau-
sality test between CSR activities and firm value. Conversely, we investigate whether 
the previous year’s CSR causes (or precedes) this year’s firm value, or vice versa. As 
shown in <Table 7>, a causal relationship may exist between CSR and corporate val-
ues; in particular, CSR precedes firm value. However, because firm value may precede 
CSR with simultaneous weak significance, a robustness check using an instrumental 
variable should be further conducted.
  5. Based on the value of variable inflation factors (VIFs), the directors’ ownership variable is 
dropped because of its high correlation with management ownership. All other variables 
have VIFs less than 2. Therefore, Hypothesis 2-4 is automatically dropped.
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Table 7. Causality Test
Causality Wald Test
Causality direction Chi-square Pr > Chi-sq Hypothesis
CSR → Value 20.12 <.0001*** H0: CSR does not cause value
Value → CSR 3.34 0.0675*** H0: Value does not cause CSR
<Table 8> indicates the fixed effect controlled results from an investigation into 
how CSR affects firm value. Initially, both the fixed effect and the random effect mod-
els are considered. The fixed effect model is selected with statistically significant 
parameters using the Hausman specification. Panel analysis of the entire sample 
shows that a relationship exists between CSR activities of the previous year and this 
year’s firm value at a 1% significance level, after controlling for various variables. In 
addition, as a control variable, larger firm size and earnings per share indicate higher 
firm values. A higher debt ratio indicates a larger firm value, and a lower growth rate 
of total assets leads to a larger firm value. The result of an analysis that separates com-
panies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is 
consistent with the results for the entire sample.
Table 8. CSR and Firm Value
Dept. variable: Tobin’s Q, Indep. Variable: CSR.
　 All sample Shanghai Exchange Shenzhen Exchange
Variables Coeff. Std. dev. t-value p-value Coeff. Std. dev. t-value p-value Coeff. Std. dev. t-value p-value
Const. –20.38 4.02 –5.07 <.0001*** –19.37 5.39 –3.6 0.0004 –14.61 4.86 –3.01 0.003
CSR –0.02 0.01 –2.68 0.0076*** –0.02 0.01 –1.96 0.051* –0.02 0.01 –1.86 0.0637*
SIZE –0.81 0.16 –5.03 <.0001*** –0.77 0.22 –3.56 0.0004*** –0.81 0.24 –3.33 0.001**** 
EPS –0.02 0.10 –0.22 0.8296*** –0.01 0.13 –0.11 0.9135 –0.06 0.16 –0.37 0.7098
LEV –0.15 0.08 –1.95 0.0515*** –0.15 0.10 –1.44 0.1508 * –0.10 0.16 –0.63 0.5318
GRW –0.11 0.07 –1.71 0.0887*** –0.09 0.13 –0.7 0.4844 –0.12 0.07 –1.68 0.0948*
F-value 2.56 2.28 3.05
R2 0.6397 0.6878 0.6878
N 277 176 101
Time 
series 3 3 3
Model fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
Notes: *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Effects of corporate social responsibility on firm value depending on 
corporate governance structure
In the previous analysis, we verify that a corporation can increase its corporate 
value through CSR activities. Furthermore, for different corporate governance/owner-
ship structures, to verify how the effects of these variables differ, panel analysis using 
such governance variables as interaction terms is performed.
<Table 9> indicates the regression results using nine corporate governance vari-
ables, each performed by adopting fixed effects panel analysis using the Tobin’s Q 
dependent variable.
The interaction terms between the corporate governance variables and CSR (CG × 
CSR) show significant negative coefficients in Eq. (1) and Eq. (8). Conversely, CSR 
has a weaker impact on corporate value because the largest shareholder stake appears 
at a higher governance level and for a higher proportion of outside directors. Namely, 
the effect of CSR on firm value weakens as the levels of the two corporate governance 
variables increase. The interaction terms of the other equations are not statistically sig-
nificant. Accordingly, inferring that a firm’s largest shareholder uses CSR more to 
obtain private benefits than for the interest of shareholders is possible. Outside direc-
tors, who may not be independent given the nature of Chinese companies, are inter-
preted as not properly checking CSR activities, thus leading to weaker effects on firm 
value.
Depending on the level of corporate governance, similar panel analysis using the 
separation of two groups should be performed. <Table 10> presents criteria for the 
corporate governance variables divided into two groups. Group A has an above aver-
age governance structure and Group B has a below average governance structure.
<Table 11> shows the results of the group panel analysis. For group A, CSRs in 
regressions (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), and (10) have positive effects on firm value at the 5% 
significance level. However, the results were not statistically significant in regressions 
(1), (2), (6), and (9). For Group B, CSRs have positive effects on firm values at a 5% 
significance level in regressions (1), (2), (6), and (9). In regressions (3), (4), (5), (7), 
(8), and (10), the results were not statistically significant. According to regression (1), 
CSR activities have positive effects on firm values in group B, which has a relatively 
lower largest shareholder stake. However, CSR does not have a significant effect in 
group A, which has a relatively higher largest shareholder stake. In regression (2), 
CSRs have positive effects on firm values in group B, which has a lower largest share-
holder stake relative to the second largest shareholder stake. However, CSRs do not 
have significant effects on firm value in group A, which has a higher largest share-
holder stake relative to the second largest shareholder stake. In regressions (3), (4), 
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and (5), CSR has a significant effect on firm value when executive ownership is high, 
director ownership is high, and audit committee ownership is high. In contrast, CSR 
does not have a significant effect on firm value when executive ownership is low, 
director ownership is low, and audit committee ownership is low. In regression (6), 
CSR increases firm value when the chairman of the board and the CEO are not the 
same person. When the chairman of the board and the CEO are the same person, CSR 
does not have significant effects. In regressions (7) and (8), CSR increases firm value 
when the board of directors and the audit committee are relatively large. However, 
CSR does not have significant effects when the board and the audit committee are rel-
atively small. In regression (10), CSR increases corporate value when the percentage 
of outside directors is relatively low. However, CSR does not have significant effects 
on firm value when the percentage of outside directors is relatively high. Finally, in 
regression (10), CSR increases firm value when the largest shareholder is the country 
government. When the largest shareholder is not the country, CSR does not signifi-
cantly influence firm value. These results are in accordance with the argument pro-
posed initially that the effects of CSR activities on firm value are different depending 
on the level of corporate governance, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. Conversely, CSR 
activities have a positive effect on firm value for a relatively low level of the largest 
shareholder ownership and a relatively high level of audit committee ownership. Fur-
thermore, similar to most companies in the United States, CSR activities positively 
affect firm value through a supervising role that is faithfully performed if the CEO and 
chairman of the board are different individuals and if the board of directors and the 
audit committee are large. In contrast, the role of independent directors in China 
appears to be dysfunctional. If the country is the company’s largest shareholder, it pur-
sues CSR activities from the perspective of its economic and social policy dimension. 
As a result, CSR has a positive effect on firm value. These results suggest that agency 
costs are present during the process of implementing CSR activities.
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Table 10. Criteria for Group Division
Group A Group B










z Above median ≥ 8.09 416
Below 
median < 8.22 415
manageshr Above median ≥ 0.0034% 418
Below 
median < 0.0034% 413
supervisorshr > 0 324 = 0 507
P = 1
CEO and 







dsize Above median ≥ 7 254
Below 
median ≤ 6 577
ssize Above median ≥ 4 403
Below 
median ≤ 3 428
outside_ratio Above median ≥ 35% 402
Below 
median < 35% 429
stateowner = 1 State-owned 603 = 0 Privately-owned 228
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<Table 12> presents the results of the effect of the corporate governance variables 
on CSR activities and indicates a negative significant coefficient on the CR1 variable. 
This result implies that the higher largest shareholder stake suggests that those compa-
nies perform CSR activities less actively in the interest of shareholders. This result 
also indicates that, if the largest shareholder of the company is the country, then the 
company is actively reluctant to perform CSR activities.
Table 12. Panel Analysis of CSR and Corporate Governance Structure
Dep. variable: CSR, Indep. Variable: CG variables
 
Variables Coeff. Std. dev. t-value p-value
Intercept –157.903   27.0236 –5.84 <.0001***
CR1 –13.7306   6.8173 –2.01 0.0445***
z 0.010351   0.0141 0.74 0.4621***
manageshr –47.4146 27.0332 –1.75 0.081***
supervisorshr 26.17099 149.11 0.18 0.861***
P 0.273508 1.1411 0.24 0.8107***
dsize 0.323896 0.3629 0.89 0.3725***
ssize –0.03742 0.4759 –0.08 0.9374***
Indep_ratio 5.068235 6.9765 0.73 0.4679***
stateowner –9.66032 2.8029 –3.45 0.0006***
SIZE 8.541777 1.0337 8.26 <.0001***
EPS 0.417667 0.6894 0.61 0.5449***
LEV –0.55919 0.5205 –1.07 0.2831***




Time series length 3
Model Fixed effect
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis represent t-values and *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively.
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Corporate governance is a mechanism that enhances the value of the business and 
maximizes shareholder value. If CSR positively affects the growth in enterprise value, 
good corporate governance indicates that those companies should perform more CSR 
activities that have lower agency costs. Therefore, a lower ownership stake of the larg-
est shareholder and of management positively affects CSR activities, which is consis-
tent with prior results.
Robustness test
We now consider the endogeneity problem of the CSR variable. Conversely, CSR 
activities may have positive effects on firm value; however, initially high-value busi-
nesses or large enterprises can also engage in more CSR activities. In this case, the 
CSR variable becomes the endogenous variable, meaning that the conventional ordi-
nary least squares method can no longer provide an unbiased consistent estimator.
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with instrumental variables were used for the aver-
age of the annual CSR score for that industry. Industry characteristics can be associat-
ed with firms’ CSR activities but are not expected to directly affect the value of the 
company (Surroca et al. 2010). Therefore, the industry average annual CSR score may 
be regarded as appropriate as an instrumental variable used to estimate the CSR vari-
able in the 2SLS analysis.
Among the previously analyzed results, only the significant results are the target of 
the 2SLS analysis using a group division regression. <Table 13> provides the results 
of the 2SLS analysis using the annual industry average CSR score as an instrumental 
variable. Panel A indicates the results of the first stage regression and Panel B indi-
cates the results of the second-stage regression.
The first stage regression analysis is used to estimate the CSR industry average 
score (CSR_indumean). This regression shows statistically significant positive (+) 
coefficients on all variables. In the second stage regression analysis, the CSR estimate 
in the first stage (predicted CSR value) is used as an explanatory variable. The regres-
sion also presents statistically significant coefficients on variables such as CR1 and 
Stateowner. Overall, the impact of CSR on firm value is still valid after controlling for 
the endogeneity problems of the CSR variable that may arise.
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CONCLUSIONS
Corporate social responsibility has emerged as an important issue with the global-
ization of the world economy. In particular, the importance of CSR activities is more 
pronounced for Chinese companies, which have enjoyed high economic growth, and 
this growth has caused significant negative side effects on society at the same time. If 
CSR has an impact on increases in firm value, companies with better corporate gover-
nance or lower monitoring costs should be more actively involved in CSR activities.
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impacts of CSR activities of 
Chinese companies on firm value and—depending on the different level of the corpo-
rate governance measures—analyze the effects of CSR activities on firm value. 
Depending on the level of corporate governance measures, the effects of CSR activi-
ties on firm value are expected to be different.
The main results are as follows. First, CSR activities generate a positive effect on 
firm value. This result suggests that companies may have an incentive to be willing 
and to continue to perform their CSR activities. Second, if the ratio of the largest 
shareholder’s stake is low (high) or the gap between the largest and the second-largest 
shareholder’s stakes is small (large), CSR activities lead to a significant positive (or 
negative) impact on firm value. Third, if executives’ shareholding ratio or the audit 
committee’s ownership is high or if the CEO and the chair are different individuals, 
then CSR activities are carried out to benefit the company and enhance firm value. 
Fourth, a positive effect of CSR activities on firm value is observed for companies 
with large boards of directors and audit committees. This effect occurs because larger 
boards and audit committees imply better corporate monitoring, thus reducing agency 
costs. In contrast, if the ratio of outside directors is relatively low, the influence of 
CSR activities on firm value is positive. Because outside directors in many Chinese 
companies are typically appointed by major shareholders, it is no surprise that these 
outside directors may choose CSR activities that serve these shareholders’ private 
interests rather than the interests of all shareholders. Finally, if the state is the largest 
shareholder of a company, CSR activities positively impact firm value because they 
are performed for social benefit instead of for private interests. Overall, CSR activities 
have a positive impact on firm value for companies with good corporate governance 
but not for companies with poor corporate governance. 
This study is important because it presents the first empirical evidence that exam-
ines whether CSR activities are associated with improved financial value depending 
on the different corporate governance measures for Chinese companies. This article 
contributes to the debate on the role of CSR in corporate strategy. It also sheds light on 
the corporate governance structure that can enhance the performance of CSR activities 
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